Social Enterprise: Who Needs It? by Galle, Brian
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2013 
Social Enterprise: Who Needs It? 
Brian Galle 
Georgetown University Law Center, brian.galle@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1843 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2302658 
 
54 B.C. L. Rev. 2025 (2013) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
? ???? ?????
Citation: 54 B.C. L. Rev. 2025 2013 
Provided by: 
Georgetown Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Mon Nov 28 13:33:15 2016
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: WHO NEEDS IT?
BRIAN GALLE*
Abstract: State statutes authorizing firms to pursue mixtures of profitable
and socially l)eneficial goals have proliferated in the past five years. In this
invited response essay, I argue that for one large class of charitable goals,
the so-called "social enterprise" firn is often privately wastefil. Although
the hybrid forni is a bit niore sensible for firnis that combine profit with
simple, easily monitored social benefits, existing laws fail to protect stake-
holders against opportunistic conversion of the firmh to pure profit-
seeking. Given these failings, I suggest that social enterprise's legislative
popularity can best be traced to a race to the bottom among states coni-
peting to siphon away federal tax dollars for local businesses. Not all hy-
brid fornis inevitably are failures, however. For example, the convertible
debt instruments proposed by Dana Braknian Reiser and Steven Dean-
the inspiration for this response-offer a promising route forward for
"cold glow" firnis wishing to clean tip some easily-ineasured but harnfil
business practices.
INTRODUCTION
Social enterprise lawmaking is a growth industry. Over the past
four years, state statutes authorizing new forms of corporate entities
have proliferated.' The new entities come in several flavors-low-profit
limited liability companies, "benefit corporations," and others-all with
the common element that they purport to authorize the firm's manag-
ers to mix profit with some other socially valuable function.
These developments are puzzling. As I argue here, organizational
theory suggests that these "hybrid" forms will typically be dominated
either by traditional nonprofit forms, or instead by plain old for-profits.
The large transaction costs of mixing complex charitable goals with
© 2013, Brian Galle. All rights reserved.
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law School. I'm grateful for helpful comments
fiom Kelli Alces, Mark Blunberg, Evelyn Brody, Jack Horak, Ben Leff, Peter Molk, and
Mark Underberg. My special thanks to Dana Brakman Reiser and Steven Dean for the
opportunity to comment on their piece, and for their gracious responses.
I Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That Profit, But Call Tap Charity, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at BI; Rachel Culley & Jill R. Horwitz, Profits v. Pupose: Hybrid Cor-
panies and the Charitable Dollar 4-5 (ITni. of Mich. Pub. Law. & Legal Theory Working Pa-
per Series, Working Paper No. 272, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2055368.
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profit imply that only considerable economies of scope, or perhaps a
handful of other unusual combinations of circumstances, can justify the
combination.
Of course, not all socially beneficial goals are complex. Firms with
simple aims, such as paying living wages or avoiding particular toxic
inputs, can more easily contract with their stakeholders or commit to
their customers. For these firms, the problem is that one or more own-
ers may decide to sell to someone uninterested in the original do-
gooder bargain. Existing social enterprise statutes only superficially ad-
dress that problem.
Against this backdrop, Dana Brakman Reiser and Steven Dean
have arrived to propose an alternative. 2 Rather than a new form of
firm, they suggest that, with a few tweaks to standard debt covenants,
entrepreneurs can successfully raise money both to earn profits and do
some good. Notably, as they acknowledge, their proposal aims only to
protect investors and entrepreneurs from opportunistic sales by their
counterparty, and does not do much to bind either side during the or-
dinary course of the firm's dealings. Their proposal does, however, fill
exactly the hole social enterprise currently faces.
Their proposal therefore reinforces my general claim that existing
social enterprise statutes add little if any social value.3 In the meantime,
proponents are busily attempting to secure various forms of subsidy.
Unless the existing statutes evolve, lawmakers and regulators should
view these calls for subsidy with deep suspicion.
Part I of this Essay sets out background economic theory on the
formation of nonprofits, and adds a new tidbit on the distortionary ef-
fects of tax rules on the choice of entities. 4 Part II expands on the
transaction-costs critique of hybrid entities, arguing that the case for
using these forms to produce most standard charitable goods is implau-
sible. 5 Part III elaborates on the suggestion that social enterprise may
overcome some narrow problems in for-profit firms that want to elimi-
2 Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with FLY Paper A HybridFinat-
cial Instrumentfor SocialEnterprise, 54 B.C. I. Rrv. 1495, 1544 (2013).
I am not the only skeptic. See, e.g., Daniel S. Kleinberge; A Myth Deconstructed: The
'Emperor's New Clothes" on the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 I)i J. CORP. 1. 879,
881 (2010) (criticizing the low-profit limited liability company form); see also J. William
Callison & Allan \V. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will
Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial ltntures, 35 Vi.
L.. Rrv. 273, 274 (2010) (criticizing the low-profit limited liability company form but gen-
erally supporting the notion of social enterprise).
4 See infra notes 9-23 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 24-59 and accompanying text.
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nate some "cold glow" aspects of their production process. 6 Part IV
considers whether the growing legislative popularity of social enterprise
casts doubt on my claim that it is mostly superfluous; I argue that it
does not, because existing hybrid entities are spawned instead by a race
to the bottom. 7 Part V returns to the Brakman Reiser and Dean pro-
posal, showing how, despite its limits, the proposal does help social en-
terprise to overcome the main problem it currently faces. 8
I. THE CONTRACT-FAILURE THEORY OF THE NONPROFIT FIRM
To understand why many existing hybrid entity proposals are deep-
ly flawed, it is helpfuil first to understand the problem that social enter-
prise purports to solve. Why would anyone ever want to found a social
enterprise, or to invest in one? Profits, of course, are nice. So is saving
the world. But what would make someone want to do both in one or-
ganization?
Let's begin with a step backward to "pure" or traditional nonprof-
its. By definition, a nonprofit is a firm that can't distribute net profits to
the people who control or invest in it.9 Why, then, would an entrepre-
neur with an exciting new idea form one? The short answer, first devel-
oped by Henry Hansmann and later elaborated by other economists, is
transaction costs and asymmetric information. 10 Suppose the new idea
is a low-cost method for improving the lives of sub-Saharan farmers.
Our irrigation entrepreneur-let's call her Ellie-plans to sell her ser-
vices not to the farmers who will most directly benefit, but instead to
others, who want to see the farmers achieve a better life. Perhaps these
funders are generous souls; maybe they are just oil companies who want
to see greater political stability in resource-rich areas. Either way, once
she has accepted money from her "customers," Ellie can easily appro-
priate most of the firm's resources to her own goals. For instance, she
can disappear into the desert with the dollars. Or, more realistically, she
might deliver a very low-quality product that allows her greater net
profits.
6 See itfra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
9 Henry B. Hansmann, The Role ofNoniprofitEitprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980).
10 David Easley & Maureen O'Hara, The Economic Role of the Nonprofit Firm, BE LL J.
ECON., Autumn 1983, at 531, 536; Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Not-For-Profit Entre-
preneurs, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 99, 100-01 (2001); Hansmann, supra note 9, at 843-45; George
G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral,
and Trusts in Commercial and CharitableEnterprises, 117 HARV. L. Riv. 1102, 1147 (2004).
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Contract law, or other less formal arrangements, comprises one
standard set of solutions to this kind of dilemma." When payment and
performance are not simultaneous, the second-moving party has op-
portunities for hold-ups and self-dealing. But the threat of liability for
breach, or some similar but less formal sanction, constrains these be-
haviors, and thus creates incentives for both sides to invest in their mu-
tually beneficial deal.
What makes Ellie's firm distinctive is that it is difficult to draft ex
ante an enforceable contract to constrain her potential for opportun-
ism. In Hansmann's version of the story, the problem is typically that
the "customers," those who are paying Ellie for her work, do not di-
rectly observe the quality of her outputs, or do not observe whether
their individual contribution is used to further that quality.12 Further, it
is difficult to imagine how one could write a contract that would specify
the quality of the firm outputs in a way that could be enforced by a
court.13 One could measure intermediate results, such as the farmers'
crop yields, but determining quality of life is more challenging. Or
perhaps the contract could be written, but the costs of specifying all the
tradeoffs and exceptions each side could invoke would be prohibitive,
relative to the value of the venture. For instance, should Ellie be liable
if she claims she exerted a lot of effort, but there happened to be a bad
drought that year? Negotiating that provision will take a long time.
Hansmann's argument, later supported formally in models by Ed-
ward Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, is that the nonprofit form is a partial
solution to these kinds of contract failures.14 By promising to limit her
payouts, Ellie has lowered her own incentives for later misappropria-
tions. To be sure, those incentives have not disappeared; she might still
simply take the money and run. But she has less of an incentive to cut
quality to increase her returns.' 5
11 See geoteially Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Manageial
Behavior Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976) (explaining how
contracting relates to firm formation).
12 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 846-48, 850-51.
13 See Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Organizations, 1999
Wis. L. REv. 227, 228-29; Triantis, supra note 10, at 1147-49.
14 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 103-06; Hansmann, supra note 9, at 844; cf
Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv.
941, 965 (1963) (suggesting that the profit-making aspect of hospitals is relatively unim-
portant because the doctors' commitment to professionalism assures patients that doctors
will prioritize their care over profits).
15 Hansmann suggests that the nonprofit promise could be enforced through private
contracts, including contracts to limit distributed profit to a fixed amount or a portion of
gross revenues. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 851-52. He argues that the nonprofit form is
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In return, Ellie can claim a basic salary and other perquisites. For
example, she gets to use the firm's resources to further her personal
goals. Of course, the combination of small cash and big personal re-
wards will be most appealing to entrepreneurs who are strongly moti-
vated by those personal goals. 16 Alternately, as I have argued elsewhere,
the entrepreneur's rewards may come from being perceived as virtuous
by others. 17 Then her commitment to sacrifice profits not only reas-
sures her funders, but also boosts her personal reward by increasing
public perceptions of her generosity.
Prior accounts have glossed over the importance of tax to the
choice of nonprofit form-not the firm's tax, but the entrepreneur's.
Profits are taxable, but personal satisfaction and the "warm glow" of
being perceived as virtuous are not. 18 Under the U.S. income tax, this
difference in effect provides up to a nearly 40% subsidy to entrepre-
neurs who trade cash profits for psychic rewards.' 9 Ellie and her inves-
tors can divide this subsidy between themselves. Further, to the extent
that the investors, too, get personal satisfaction from investing with El-
generally preferable because it economizes on drafting and enforcement costs. Id. This is
puzzling, as permitting some limited distribution of profit seems inconsistent with the rest
of his account. Capping profit payouts does cabin the managers' incentives to cut quality.
But how can individual contributors know whether their money makes any marginal con-
tribution to charitable production? Cf. Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 109 (observing
that donors do not contribute to for-profit firms because contributions are unlikely to
increase quality on the margins). For example, imagine that a manager works for profit
until she hits the cap, and then for charity for the rest of the year. Contributors cannot
know whether their funds will be used in the first stage or the second, or indeed if there
will be a second stage, because the manager's incentive is to just barely reach it. This is
akin to the public goods problem Hansmann previously identifies as a source of contract
failure. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 850-51.
16 Myron J. Roomkin & Burton A. Weisbrod, Maoageidal Compensation and Jncentives in
For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals, 15 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 750, 753-54 (1999) (discussing
compensation mechanisms and the utility of nonmonetary incentives).
17 Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 TEx. L. REv. 1213, 1224-25 (2010).
18 ,ee Daniel Shaviro, The Man W4/ho Lost Too Much: Zarin x. Commissioner and the Meas-
urement of Taxable Consumption, 45 TAx L. Rrv. 215, 223-29 (1990) (discussing the standard
income tax approach to non-material benefits).
19 Id. at 223-24. The real subsidy is probably a good bit smaller. First, many managers are
likely to be taxed at below the naximum statutory rate. See I.R.C. § 1 (a) (2006) (providing
for a graduated rate of tax on individual taxable income). Second, small businesses are al-
ready heavily subsidized, such as through devices that allow entrepreneurs lawfully to convert
their heavily taxed labor income into lightly taxed capital earnings. Victor Fleischer, Taxing
Founders' Stock, 59 UCLA L. RiEv. 60, 80-88 (2011). Moreover, even if Ellie's business were
taxable, some or all of this subsidy could be lost at the firm level because the firm would like-
ly lose the deduction it would otherwise have claimed if it had paid Ellie in cash. See id. Fi-
nally, many small businesses unlawfully reduce their tax bill by underreporting income. See
Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, J. ECON. IERS P., Winter 2007, at
25, 29-30.
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lie, and take a lower payout as a result, they are also receiving a tax sub-
sidy-they swap taxable profits for untaxed satisfaction.
To be sure, the nonprofit form is costly. For one, you can't eat pres-
tige: satisfaction and other perquisites of entrepreneurship are less liq-
uid than cash compensation would be. Exiting a venture is also difficult
for the entrepreneur; ownership stakes in the firm cannot readily be
sold, so founders who walk away from their venture typically must sacri-
fice any property or "sweat equity" they've contributed to the firm.20
Further, because the firm cannot sell equity to raise money, its main
non-donative source of outside funding will be through borrowing. Debt
financing adds additional "agency costs" to the firm: Since the creditors'
interest does not align with the managers', the firm must negotiate and
submit to costly bonding provisions that may limit its flexibility. 2'
Firms choose nonprofit status, then, when the benefits exceed
these costs. 22 Entrepreneurs who derive large value from perquisites-
those who are strongly motivated by altruism or warm glow-are more
likely to accept the tradeoff of perks over cash tradeoff. That tradeoff is
also easier to swallow when there wouldn't be much profit to distribute
anyway. 23 Nonprofit status is also more attractive when the costs of giv-
ing up equity financing are lower, that is, when equity financing would
be prohibitively expensive, debt is cheap, or the firm has access to some
special finding such as donations or government grants. Presumably
20 Exit constraints are a bit looser tinder many state laws. States typically permit non-
profits to opt to be "mutual benefit" corporations, in which case the firm can repurchase
ownership stakes from its members. MARION R. FREMONT-SMITII, GOVERNING NONPROFIT
ORGANIZAIONS 159-60 (2004). But these entities are generally not eligible for federal
501(c) (3) status, and they typically cannot claim most state-level tax benefits reserved for
"community benefit" or charitable organizations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(b) (as
amended in 2008) (requiring applicants to demonstrate that firm assets will be reserved
for charitable purposes upon dissolution).
21 The agency costs of debt may be somewhat lower at nonprofit firms than at tradi-
tional for-profit firms. Usually, an entrepreneur and her equity investors take more risks
than lenders would prefer because the equity holders are entitled to all the upside gains
that would result friom successful gambles. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 334-35. By
definition, nonprofit managers do not have this opportunity. Instead, they draw a salary,
which makes them in effect a creditor of the firm. So it would seem that this traditional
source of creditor-manager conflict does not arise. There could, howevei; be other sources
of conflict. Other stakeholders, such as donors, may offer the manager some incentives,
such as bonuses, to take on additional risk. Creditors may also demand that the firm be
managed in a way that preserves existing revenue streams, even if that revenue is no longer
an important goal for the firm. Consider, for instance, a hospital with significant debts that
is reviewing its charity-care and debtor-forgiveness policies. Creditors may demand a more
revenue-friendly approach than the hospital's managers want to pursue.
22 Hansmann, supra note 9, at 879.
23 Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 105.
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the tax subsidy for perks also tips some marginal entrepreneurs from
for-profit to nonprofit.
II. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND THE THEORY OF THE (HYBRID) FIRM
This account of the nonprofit firm makes social enterprise, or
what I've been calling "hybrid" firms, something of a puzzle. 24 An oth-
erwise profit-making firm that wants also to produce some charitable
good seems to face all of the costs I've just mentioned. In many in-
stances, those costs are even greater than they would be for a pure char-
ity, and the offsetting benefits are even smaller.
A. Make or Buy?: The Downside ofIntegration
Most obviously, the opportunity costs of charitable spending are
higher at a profitable firm. In general, if the firm is allocating capital
efficiently, it should have new investment opportunities that exceed
those available in the general marketplace for capital. 25 If the firm can't
do better than its shareholders with its money, the shareholders will
demand that the firm return the cash to them so they can invest with it.
Giving up these supranormal returns in order to invest in creating
some charitable output is thus costlier than if the shareholders spent
the money themselves. The firm's stakeholders will have to place a par-
ticularly high value on perks to justify this higher expense.
Consider next the costs of contracting. There is nothing about
running a for-profit business that makes the difficulty of contracting for
the production of charitable goods easier, and indeed the opposite is
very likely true. Suppose the entrepreneur and her investors jointly
agree that they want to divert some of the firm's revenues to the chari-
table activity. 26 But how much charity will the firm do, at what quality,
and at what cost? Now the investors have two worries: that the manager
will do too little charity, and also that she will do too much. 27
24 Although the term "social enterprise" can also include organizational forms other
than the "hybrid form" I have discussed, see Robert A. Katz & Anthony Page, The Role of
SocialEiteprise, 35 VT. L. Rrv. 59, 60-62 (2010), I use the two terms as synonyms here for
convenience.
25 WILLIAM J. CARNEY, CORPORAIE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND PRAC Iic 717 (2d ed.
2010).
26 Assume for now that the charitable output cannot itself be produced at a profit. For
example, it might be a quasi-public good: when one person buys it, many other people can
also benefit without paying. Then almost no one has an incentive to pay.
27 Cf Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to Promote
the Public Interest, 112 COiJuM. L. REv. 578, 602-13 (2012) (arguing that existing outside
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Worse, the investors will have lost what used to be one of their most
effective monitoring tools. When the firm was purely profit-seeking, it
was easy for investors to pay the manager in a way that would align her
interests with theirs: they gave her stock, or stock options, making her a
partial owner like them. 28 There is currently no pay instrument, how-
ever, that matches a manager's ex ante expected pay to her perform-
ance in fulfilling charitable goals-no surprise, given that those goals
are tough to measure. 29 So now the manager has two tasks, only one of
which can easily be encouraged through incentive pay. In that setting,
some economists argue, agency costs are so high that it is often prefer-
able to simply split the two sets of tasks into two distinct firms.3 0
For similar reasons, the hybrid firm likely cannot obtain cheap fi-
nancing through donations. Donors, like other investors, have no real
way to control the hybrid manager. And donors are even worse off than
many investors because they have no "exit" option. Investors unhappy
with what they are able to observe of the entrepreneur's behavior can
usually just sell, if the firm's shares are reasonably liquid, and buy stock
in another company more suited to their preferences.3 1 Donors, in con-
trast, usually can't get their money back. Perhaps the donor can write a
contract that authorizes reimbursement if the donee misuses the funds,
monitoring tools for hybrid entities are a poor fit for goals such as "diversity," "health," or
"education"). For additional discussion of the two-task problem in the production of pub-
lic goods, see AVINASH K. I)ixt , THE MAKING O1, ECONOMIC PotLicy: A TRANSAC I IoN-COST
PoIt tICs PERSPECTIV 95-98 (1996); Daron Acemoglu et al., Incentives in Markets, Firms,
and Govcrn meats, 24J.L. EcON. & ORG. 273, 274 (2007); Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope
of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1136-41 (1997).
Even if the parties could negotiate a contract in advance in an effort to balance the com-
peting goals, doing so would sacrifice some of the entrepreneur's superior knowledge and
capacity for experiment. Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SE TON
HALL L. Rrv. 819, 851-52 (2012).
28 See David I. Walkei; The Law and Economics ofExecutive Compensation: Theory and Evi-
dence, in RISEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORAIE LAW 232, 236-37
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). It is usually argued that options are
needed to make managers fully as risk-seeking as investors. Id. at 237-38. The manage;
unlike the fully diversified investor, has undiversifiable human capital invested in the firm;
therefore, she must be given an instrument that offers her pure upside to compensate her
for taking risky wagers with her human capital. See id.
29 SeeJill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior Law, and Ethics of
Not-forProfit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. Rrv. 1345, 1410-11 (2003) (arguing that incentive-
based pay is inaccurate and therefore undesirable in charitable organizations).
30 Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Con-
tracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 43-48 (1991); Bengt Holm-
strom, TheFirm as a Subeconomy, 15j.L. EcON. & ORG. 74, 90-99 (1999).
31 D. Gordon Smith, The Role of Shareholders in the Modern American Corporation, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE tECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ILAW, supra note 28, at 52, 61-62.
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maybe even with interest. 32 But, again, those contracts are extremely
difficult to write and enforce, as any casual student of the law of chari-
table trusts could attest. 33 And donors of labor-volunteers-almost
certainly cannot reclaim their lost investment.
In addition to these higher costs, the rewards of charitable work at
a hybrid may be lower, too. I've argued before that even if investors can
monitor the entrepreneur, outside observers usually can't.3 4 If the good
graces of those observers is an important source of warm glow for man-
agers and investors, then the hybrid form costs both groups a good deal
of reward-reward that is specially tax-favored relative to cash. 35
Given all these factors, it seems the best option for the firm and its
investors will often be to "buy" charity, rather than "make" it.36 That is,
even if it makes sense to use firm funds for charitable work (or for in-
vestors to allow the firm to buy charitable output on their behalf), there
is no reason the work has to be done inside the firm. The firm could
instead just find an outside charity-or, heck, found one-and donate
money to it.
37
Allocating charitable production to an outside firm also makes
sense from a managerial perspective. The time and attention of top
leadership is a key, and scarce, resource for the firm. 38 Managers skilled
at profitably operating in their own industry may lack skill or interest in
supervising an in-house charity.
32 State law traditionally was hostile to revocable gifts, but the modern trend is toward
increased donor control. FREMONT-SMITII, supra note 20, at 338-39.
33 For an overxiew of the problems of enforcing gifts to charitable organizations over
time, see id. at 173-84.
34 Galle, supra note 17, at 1224-25.
.5 Admittedly, though, the tax benefits of perquisites are smaller for the hybrid firm.
When the hybrid firm uses cash to replace lost warm glow, it can take a deduction against any
taxable profit it earns. If tie firm's marginal tax rate is equal to the employee's rate, the two
effects are a wash. Currently, top idiv idual rates are a bit higher than corporate rates, and
are much higher than the effective tax rate for international firms. See Philip Ditmner, Tax
Found., U.S. Coporations Suffer High Effective Tax Rates by Initermational Standards, SPECIAL REP.,
Sept. 2011, at 1, 10, available at http://taxfoundafion.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/
docs/sr195.pdf. Compare I.R.C. § 1 (a) (2006) (stating that the top indiidual tax rate is 39.6%),
with I.R.C. § 11 (b) (1) (D) (2006) (stating that the top corporate tax rate is 35%). In these lat-
ter two scenarios, there is still a net tax cost to replacing warm glow with cash.
36 For an overview of the literature on the boundaries of the firm, and an empirical as-
sessment, see Peter G. Klein, The Make-or-Buy Decision: Lessons from Empirical Studies, in
HANDBOOK 01 NEw INSIITUI IONAL ECONOMICs 435, 455-57 (Claude M6nard & Mary M.
Shirley eds., 2008).
37 Culley & Horwitz, supra note 1, at 16.
38 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionimaking in Corporate Governance,
55 VAND. L. R v. 1, 6-7 (2002) (discussing strategies for abating corporate shirking).
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The collapse of Google.org ("DotOrg"), Google's erstwhile philan-
thropic arm, is instructive in this regard. According to published ac-
counts, Sergey Brin 39 was so bored during important DotOrg meetings
that he would do pushups. 40 Experts opined that another of DotOrg's
main failings was that it treated every problem as an engineering prob-
lem instead of trying to understand what was really going wrong in the
world.41 For instance, Google did not pursue solutions that its staff
found too simplistic to challenge their programming skills. 42 But it's no
surprise that was what DotOrg did, because, after all, it was run by en-
gineers.
Lastly, donating to charity, rather than doing it, is also often feder-
ally tax-favored, as Lloyd Mayer and Joseph Ganahl have recently
shown. 43 Firms can take an annual tax deduction for charitable contri-
butions of up to 10% of their profits. 44 They receive that deduction in
the year of the donation, regardless of when the charity actually spends
the money.45 In contrast, if the firm spent the same amount building its
capacity to do good works, those costs would have to be capitalized.
The firm would get only a fraction of the deduction immediately and
would recover the rest over time as its capacity depreciates. 46 So dona-
tions are typically more valuable, taking into account the time-value of
money.47
B. Reasons to Be Hybrid?
Against this litany of problems with hybrid charity, we might stack
the possibility of economies of scope or other efficiencies that could
39 Aside for readers who may have just awakened from a twenty-year sleep: Brin is one of
Google's two founding genius programmers. Managment Team, GOOGI: INC., http://www.
google.com/about/company/facts/management/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013).
4o Stephanie Strom & Miguel Helft, Google Finds It Hard to Reinvent Philanthropy, N.Y
TIMIS,Jan. 29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/business/30charity.html.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social EntepTise, 66 S IAN. L. Rrv.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 20-21), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract- 2256539.
44 I.R.C § 170(b) (2) (a) (2006).
45 BORIS I. BI IKER E I Al., FF7 )1RA1. INCOME TAXATION O INI)IVIIUALS 25.01[3] (3d
ed. 2002).
46 See, e.g., I.R.C §§ 167, 199, 263, 263A.
47 An exception would be if the firm were unprofitable on paper at the time of the do-
nations-for example, because it already had lots of other carried-over deductions from
past years available. In that case, the unused donations would carry forward into the fu-
ture, likely making them comparable in value to the depreciation deductions the firm
would get for producing in-house.
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result from for-profit production of charitable goods. 48 One possible
candidate could be intellectual property, held by a for-profit firm, that
is also very valuable in producing a charitable good. Google's ability to
use its search algorithms to track flu outbreaks is a potential example.
In many cases the IP cannot simply be donated or licensed-for in-
stance, because exploiting it requires deep technical sophistication, or
sharing it risks undermining trade secrets or otherwise reducing the
value of the IP to the owner firm. On the other hand, it's hard to imag-
ine a firm with more valuable IP than Google, and even that wasn't
enough to hold Google and Google.org together.
Another possible advantage often pointed to by supporters of the
hybrid form is the superior cost effectiveness of for-profits. 49 The claim
is that nonprofit managers have little incentive to find cost savings, so
that a for-profit firm that takes on charitable goals can learn to do more
with less. 50 I and other commentators point to some motives nonprofit
managers might have to be efficient, such as the fact that satisfaction
with accomplishing their mission substitutes for a share of the profits,
that donors care about efficiency, or the possibility that boards might
offer managers some limited forms of incentive pay.51 In the end, em-
pirical investigation will have to determine which side is right. There is
some evidence that donors indeed care at least about administrative
costs, and that pay-for-performance does exist in the nonprofit sector,
but the ultimate question remains open. 52
Hybrid advocates also mention that pure charities cannot easily
access capital to scale up their production. 53 This is another version of
the costs of capital point: if investors are happy to finance operations
despite the risks of opportunism by the entrepreneur, of course it
48 M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altru-
ism, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 571, 590-93 (2009). "Economies of scope" are savings that result
when multiple products or tasks are delivered more efficiently as a bundle than they would
if completed in separate firms.
49 Katz & Page, supra note 24, at 92-93; Anup Malani & Eric A. Posne; The CaseforFor
Profit Charities, 93 VA. I. Rrv. 2017, 2048-50 (2007).
50 Malani & Posner, supra note 49, at 2048-50.
51 Galle, supra note 17, at 1222-30; James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Sta-
tits: A Charitable Assessment, 108 MICH. I. Rrv. 1179, 1192-1203 (2010); Leff, supra note 27,
at 868-75; Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ICON. LI 1.
701, 719 (1996).
52 MARC JEGIRS, MANAGERIAlI ECONOMICS 01 NoN-PRoI II ORGANIZAIIONS 50-51
(2008); see also Brian Galle & David I. Walker, Nonprofit Executive Pay as an Agency Prob-
lem: Evidence from U.S. Colleges and Universities 20-21 (Aug. 1, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id- 2187979.
53 Katz & Page, supra note 24, at 94.
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makes less sense to take on the costs of the nonprofit form. It is un-
clear, though, whether expansion is or should be an important non-
profit goal. The agency problems of charitable production are likely
only to get larger as the firm expands and each individual investor's
control over the managers becomes more remote.
In any event, even charities with ready access to cash, such as uni-
versities, typically prioritize quality over quantity. The New York Phil-
harmonic is not opening NYP-branded orchestras around the country,
exactly because the point of the endeavor is grand artistic achievement,
not pop nusic.54
A final volley supporters of hybrid charities might offer would be
to question whether the costs of contracting for charitable goods are
really that high. Since Hansmann first wrote in the early 1980s, scholars
have penned considerable new literature on the exchange of "cre-
dence" goods, or goods whose quality customers cannot easily monitor,
ranging from legal services to organic foods. 55 Though these goods
share the property that their producers have opportunities to cheat on
quality, few of the firms producing them are organized as nonprofits.
Law firms likely offer the most familiar example for readers of this
law review. Clients generally cannot closely observe the effort or quality
of legal services. Despite law firms' lack of transparency, experts report
that the firms stay in business through their reputations, trust-building
human interactions, and professional standards with state-subsidized
enforcement mechanisms, among other tools.56
Other industries rely on different "technologies" for reducing
agency costs. 57 Glaeser and Shleifer point to Silicon Valley, where co-
location of many employers offers workers assurances that employers
cannot easily exploit the workers' investment in industry-specific hu-
54 See Glaeser & Shleifer, supra note 10, at 108 (arguing that nonprofits prioritize qual-
ity over quantity).
55 E.g., Uwe Dulleck & Rudolf Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Special-
ists: The Economics of Crceduce Goods, 44J. EcON. LIT. 5, 9-11 (2006); Curtis R. Taylo; The
Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures, 103J. PoE. ICON. 53, 65-69 (1995); Kenneth
H. Wathne & Jan B. Heide, Opportunism in Interfirm Relationships: Forms, Outcomes, and Solu-
tions, j. MARKETING, Oct. 2000, at 36, 45-50.
56 Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA. L. Riv.
1707, 1712-19 (1998); cf OLIVER E. WIlLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS 01 GOVERNANCE 116
(1996) (discussing the role of reputation in reducing opportunism in repeated contract-
ing).
57 Gary Gereffi et al., The Governance of Global Value Chains, 12 Rrv. INt'L IOi. EcON.
78, 82-84 (2005); Taylor, supra note 55, at 65-69. In some cases the solution for reducing
agency costs is regulation, such as malpractice liability. Dulleck & Kerschbamer, supra note
55, at 19-20.
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man capital. 58 And, as they note, for some goods the cost of opportun-
ism is relatively triial-for how many people does it really matter how
the farmer grew her tomato?-so that expensive commitment devices
such as the nonprofit form are not worthwhile. 59
None of these examples make a clear case for hybrid entities. In
each, it isn't so much that the firm has figured out how to contract to
produce credence goods, as that some outside factor diminishes the
need for any contract. We may nonetheless have walked just up to the
edge of a viable model for the hybrid form: innovations in governance
techniques that might allow firms credibly to commit to something
other than pure profit.
III. TOWARD A THEORY OF THE HYBRID FIRM:
WARMING UP COLD GLOW?
An example of governance innovations that might justify the hy-
brid form is what I'll call the thawing of the cold glow firm. The cold
glow firm has a production process that stakeholders or consumers find
particularly loathsome. It kills dolphins, poisons the water, sells "con-
flict diamonds," or hires factory workers at pennies per hour. For its
sins, it must sell products at a discount, pay out higher rates of return to
investors, pay managers a premium, or all of the above. 60
Firms have learned how to contract around many of these prob-
lems. As ample literature now demonstrates, firms can hire outside au-
ditors or other third-party verification systems to oversee the firm's
compliance with cold glow reducing goals. 61 If the goals are readily de-
fined, quantified, and measured, then both contract drafting and en-
forcement can be fairly cheap. For instance, if the firm pledges to pay
workers at least median hourly wages for their home country, or to "off-
58 Glaeser & Shleifer; supra note 10, at 108.
59 Id.
60 Cf. Michael C. Jensen, ldue Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objec-
tive Function, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN., Fall 2001, at 8, 16-17 (arguing that firm value may
depend on the attitudes and emotions of customers and stakeholders towards the firm);
Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship, J. EcON. IPERSP., Fall 1995, at 97, 104-05 (describing the "green
premium" for environmentally innovative firms).
61 E.g., NEIL (GUNNINGIIAM ET AL., SIIADES OF (REEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND EN-
VIRONMENT 20-40 (2003); Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and
Evolution of the Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 1717, 1742-65 (2010).
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set" its carbon emissions, there is relatively little complexity in enforc-
ing those promises. 62
Although more abstract promises, such as pledges to be "green,"
shade closer to the challenges of contracting for charitable goods, in-
ternational standards have developed to allow for verification of com-
mon best practices, including in the "green" context.63 Uniform tech-
nical standards allow for more "modular" production, allowing firms to
contract with each other more readily while retaining confidence that
they meet the standards promised to consumers. 64
Admittedly, there is a real possibility that firms could capture their
auditor, and so the process of establishing credibly independent verifi-
cation systems is a challenge. 65 Firms may have to pay a premium to
compensate independent auditors for the costs of maintaining a clean
reputation. Hiring PricewaterhouseCoopers or Ernst & Young is not
necessarily cheap. As long as this cost is less than the premium the
counterparty would demand for its cold glow, however, the auditing
expense is worthwhile. Some monitors may also act out of altruism or
ideological commitment, making verification more affordable for
smaller firms. 66
Surprisingly, though, there are legal obstacles to the thaw. Some
commentators suggest that corporate law sets at least a default rule bar-
ring firm managers from maximizing anything other than shareholder
profit. 67 At first glance, this seems bizarre. Remedying cold glow almost
certainly provides returns on investment:68 though of course the in-
62 Admittedly, it can be difficult to calculate carbon burdens when accounting for the
entire chain of production and distribution for all of the firm's inputs.
63 See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Green Business and the Importance of Reflexive Law: What Mi-
chael Porter Didn't Say, 62 AIMIN. L. Rrv. 1063, 1097-1105 (2010) (discussing the chal-
lenges of green monitoring in large firms); Green Globe Certification Standard, GREEN (LOBE,
http://greenglobe.com/green-globe-certification-standard/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013)
(providing a certification and ranking of the businesses that comply with the best "green"
practices).
64 Gereffi et al., supra note 57, at 85-88, 97.
65 See Gabriele Jahn et al., The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Pol-
icy Tool, 28J. CONSUMER POL'Y 53, 54-57 (2005).
66 TimothyJ. Feddersen & Thomas W. Gilligan, Saints and Markets: Activists and the Sup-
ply of Credence Goods, 10J. ECON. & MGMI. STRATEGv 149, 151 (2001).
67 For helpful critical commentary, see Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well WhileDoiug Good: Re-
assessing the Scope of Directors' Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-
Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & lnt I. Rrv. 409, 430-63 (2002); A.A. Berle, Jr., For
Whom Cotporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REv. 1365, 1367-69 (1932).
68 Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of How the Business
Judgment Rule Protects a Board's Decision to Engage in Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO I.
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vestment might not pay off, courts generally treat managers' investment
decisions with great deference. 69 Even if any positive returns are only
for the managers, they still may well save the shareholders on the pre-
mium they would otherwise pay the manager to overcome her dis-
taste. 70 Shareholders who don't experience the cold glow, and prefer
the higher cash return, can simply sell and seek out another firm as evil
as the warming firm used to be. 71
One case most of these commentators point to, however, the 2010
Delaware Court of Chancery decision in eBay Domestic Holdings v. New-
mark, makes a good bit more sense. 72 The case involved a suit by a mi-
nority corporate shareholder of the online listings service "Craigslist."
The majority stake was held by Craigslist's founders, who apparently saw
their newspaper-killing enterprise as a public service, and who there-
fore refused to maximize revenues. 73 In this situation, the shareholder's
argument was much stronger. Minority stakes in firms whose control-
ling interest is held by a founder with idiosyncratic views are, shall we
say, not typically very liquid. 74 With the exit option off the table, one
RiEv. 623, 664-65 (2007); Judd F. Sneirson, GOen Is Good: Sustainabilitq, Profitability, and a
New Paradigm for Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. Rrv. 987, 1009-10 (2009).
69 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Iitefest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733,
763-813 (2005).
70 Perhaps the assumption is that the manager, unless constrained by law, will be rela-
tively indifferent to the costs of remedying her distaste. In that case, the shareholders may
lose significantly more than they would save in salary. Cf. id. at 836 (noting that managerial
control of corporate charitable donations creates an additional way for a manager to ex-
tract rents).
An alternative justification for allowing managers to deviate from pure profit is that
the goal of the firm is not simply shareholder value maximization, but instead maximizing
the joint value for all of its stakeholders. Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Law and the Team Pro-
duction Problem, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON IHr ECONOMICS O1 CORPORAIT LAW, supra
note 28, at 33, 47.
71 See Elhauge, supra note 69, at 808 (arguing that capital markets will discipline man-
agers who deviate too far from shareholder preferences). Tax differences might also moti-
vate a split between shareholders and the entrepreneur. Both can substitute warm glow for
cash or vice versa. As we know, only the cash is taxed. If shareholders pay a lower rate of
tax, they are less interested in replacing cash with emotional satisfaction. At present, U.S.
taxes on dividends and profits from the sale of stock are taxed at about half of the rate of
salary. SeeI.R.C. §§ 1(a)-(d), I(h) (1), 1(h) (11), 1221 (2006).
72 16 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. Ch. 2010); seeJ. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: SocialEn-
terprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUs. L. Rrv. 1, 13 (2012) (not-
ing that defenders of social enterprise cite the eBay case "ad nauseam").
73 eBay, 16 A.3d at 6, 8, 26.
74 Craigslist also adopted provisions making it more difficult for eBay to sell. d. at 35.
An additional complication for eBay was that its stake, while a minority, was relatively large,
so that selling it all at once would likely have significantly depressed the price per share. See
id. at 44.
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can at least see why the court would be more sympathetic to the "op-
pressed" minority shareholder-a shareholder which, as a firm, likely
did not get any direct value from the warm glow-generating business
model.
Our warmth-seeking entrepreneur now faces a catch-22. If she
keeps a majority stake in her firm, she sets up a situation in which
shareholders might take control of the firm in court.75 On the other
hand, of course, if she retains only a minority interest, the shareholders
might take control in the boardroom. Either way, shareholders who
prefer the chill-for example, because the opportunity for profit has
increased or their tax on it has fallen-can force the entrepreneur to
give lip on her plans. 76 At that stage, the entrepreneur's exit is prob-
lematic. She can sell her stake to the other shareholders, but by as-
sumption she values cash less than the other aspects of the business. As
a result, she may be unable to recover a good portion of the human
capital she invested.
Presumably this is where the hybrid entity would step in. The en-
trepreneur offers investments in a firm that limits shareholders' exit
rights, or limits their ability to take control of the firm. The firm pledg-
es to pursue only relatively more easily contracted for warm glow pro-
jects, such as selling only "conflict-free" diamonds. 77 Buyers take a lower
cash return in exchange for higher warm glow. Since the shareholders'
protections against managerial profiteering are now more limited, they
will likely want some guarantee that the entrepreneur won't exit and
leave the firm in control of a newer, cash-motivated manager.
Except that, as Brakman Reiser and Dean carefully show, existing
social enterprise statutes don't actually do those things. 78 Neither inves-
75 I don't want to overstate the significance of these legal impediments. See Shlensky v.
Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (rejecting the argument that protection
for minority interests should weaken the business judgment rule). My point is only that the
argument for protecting minority shareholders is stronger when their ability to exit is less-
ened.
76 See Katz & Page, supra note 24, at 96-97 (noting that social enterprise firms must
guard against opportunistic conversion to profit-seeking by some stakeholders).
77 Cf. Hansmann, supra note 9, at 887-88 (noting that federally subsidized affordable
housing is sometimes built by "limited dividend" firms, and this is workable because the
government can obtain detailed financial reporting on the firm relatively easily). I actually
believe that Hansmann is wrong about the low costs of contracting for affordable housing,
as contracting for the government's goals in affordable housing is more difficult than he
suggests. See Nestor M. Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The
Case of Housing, 24 YAIt I. & PoL'y Rrv. 263, 287-97 (2006) (describing the complex na-
ture of public-private housing policy). But the general point remains that some goods can
easily be contracted for and monitored.
78 Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 2, at 1507-13.
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tors nor entrepreneurs face a truly limited exit because all of the exist-
ing firms can readily be converted into a standard corporation, which
can then be sold. 79 The added step may increase the costs of exit some-
what, but determined stakeholders on either side can still get out of the
deal.
IV. IF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE STATUTES Do NOT ACCOMPLISH MUCH, WHY
Do STATES KEEP PASSING THEM?
My theory predicts that the world should not have produced many
hybrid firms, at least not under the set of rules currently available for
them. No one has yet collected any good data on how much capital is
invested in social enterprise organizations.80 One available data point,
however, is that a large and growing number of states have enacted stat-
utes authorizing then. 8' This seems an inconvenient fact for my theory.
It turns out, though, that the widespread legislative popularity of
social enterprise has little to do with its merits. Social enterprise is the
product of a race to the bottom. Perhaps that is too strong a term. It is,
at a minimum, a device by which state governments are seeking to di-
vert money from the federal treasury to the bank accounts of in-state
firms.
Early proponents of hybrid entities were perfectly upfront about
the tax motive. As they explained, the hope was that social enterprise
organizations would be ruled eligible for "program-related invest-
ments" by nonprofit foundations.8 2 New York's legislature even re-
ported in its official explanation of one social enterprise bill that "[t] lie
79 Id.
80 A preliminary tally of social enterprise organizations found that there are about 1000
firms nationwide, of uncertain size. See Ben Schreckingeg, Virtue Inc.: Can the Na "Benefit
Coiporation" Chartes Give Companies a Couscicuce?, Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2012, http://www.
bostonglobe.com/ ideas/ 2012/ 11 25 /virtie-inc /sMNhJRcOIgZOrqjpLTALrN /story.html;
Here's the Latest L3C Tally as of: September 27, 2013, IN IERSICTOR PARTNFRS, 13C (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.intersectorl3c.coin/13ctally.htinl. Hybrid supporters also like to cite the
example of the Grameen Bank, the well-known "micro-credit" organization. E.g., J. Haskell
Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, Enforceotent, Capital-Raising and
Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liabilit Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2011). The
Grameen Bank, though, is not a hybrid, and not even a corporation; it is a borrower-owned
cooperative. Grameen Bank at a Glance, GRAMIF N BANK, http://www.grameen-info.org/
index.php?option-corn content&task-view&id-26&Itemid-175 (last visited Sept. 27,
2013). The closest U.S. analogues to the Grameen Bank are member-owned mutual banks.
81 Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 2, at 1507-13.
82 John Tyle; Negating the Legal Poblenm of Having "Two Mastrs ": A Eramework for L3C Fidu-
ciary Duties and Accountability, 35 Vi. L. Riv. 117, 122 (2010); Bruce D. Collins, Low-Profits,
INSI)E COUNSE L (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2008/01/02/lowprofits.
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business entity form and legislation were drafted with the goal of com-
plying with federal Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations relevant
to Program Related Investments (PRIs) by foundations. ' 's 3 The details
are boring for most readers, but the gist is that federal tax law obliges
foundations to spend 5% or so of their assets each year, with a narrow
exception for investments that themselves could be described as ac-
complishing a charitable purpose.8 4
If hybrids could qualify under the program-related investment ex-
ception, they could reap a federal tax bonanza of up to 20% or more of
the costs of their capital. Assume that the marginal investor in the hy-
brid entity is a charitable foundation, a tax-exempt entity. Any profits
paid by the hybrid to the foundation would be free of federal tax. 8 5 Pre-
sumably, the hybrid could pay a correspondingly lower rate of return.
For instance, if a tax-paying investor would demand a 10% rate of re-
turn, but pays 20% in capital gains taxes, the investor nets 8% after tax.
All else equal, a tax-exempt investor should accept that same 8% re-
turn.s 6 The hybrid saves money, and the federal government collects
less tax. Just as tax-exempt bonds are effectively a federal subsidy for
state borrowers, 87 Program Related Investments status would be a fed-
eral subsidy for hybrids. 88
Now consider the political economy of a statute at the state level
that authorizes hybrid entities. If a state legislator authorizes such hy-
brids, most of the federal costs of any subsidy that her state's businesses
receive will be paid for by taxpayers in the other forty-nine states. The
hybrid's investors may well be out of state, so the authorizing state
83 S.B. S3011-2011, 2011-2012 S. Reg. Sess., (N.Y 2011).
84 Culley & Horwitz, supra note 1, at 8-11.
85 This tax benefit would only be realized assuming that these payments are not subject
to unrelated business income tax, which they likely would not be unless the underlying
investments were purchased on margin. Cassady V. ("Cass") Brewei; A Novel Approach to
Using LLCs for Quasi-Charitable Endeavors (A/K/A "Social Enterprise'), 38 WM. M ITCHE il L.
Rrv. 678, 705-07 (2012).
S6 Of course, the tax-exempt investor would rather earn 10%. But presumably there is
enough value to the foundation in escaping the 5% payout requirement that it will accept
a lower rate. See Brewer, supra note 85, at 712-13 (outlining the advantages of Program
Related investments over simple grant).
87 See John M. R. Chalmers, Default Risk Cannot Explain the Muni Puzzle: Evidence from
Municipal Bonds That Are Secured by U.S. Treasury Obligations, 22 Rrv. FIN. StIu. 281, 284-88
(1998).
88 See Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75
VA. 1L. Rrv. 605, 612 (1989) (noting that "any business currently subject to the corporate
income tax would yield a higher return in the hands of an exempt nonprofit than it does
to its current shareholders because the corporate-level tax would be eliminated by such a
transfer").
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doesn't even lose tax revenues on the investor's profits. What's not to
like? And proponents are angling for other, more direct, federal incen-
tives. 89
Imagine, too, that a neighboring state authorizes hybrids. If I am a
North Carolina legislator, and in South Carolina, the businesses that
employ my constituents can get a 20% federal subsidy, I can watch
those jobs go across the border, or instead enact legislation that is virtu-
ally costless to me. Again, this is not a tough decision.
That's why I describe social enterprise statutes as a race to the bot-
tom. Perhaps that's unfair; maybe there are good corporate governance
justifications for the existing hybrid forms I've overlooked. 90 Given my
alternative explanation, though, the simple fact that they have been
popular with legislators does little to establish their efficiency.
V. HYBRID INSTRUMENTS, NOT HYBRID FIRMS?
To summarize the argument so far: existing social enterprise stat-
utes give us solutions in search of a problem, while the real problem of
exit in cold glow firms remains unsolved. This seems an opportune
moment to return to Brakman Reiser and Dean. Their proposal, recall,
is that firms should issue convertible debt securities, with a covenant
permitting debt holders to assume a controlling equity interest if the
entrepreneur attempts to sell before the end of a contractual period.91
In this way, they argue, both investors and entrepreneurs have assur-
ances that the other party won't transfer control to purely profit-
motivated buyers. 92
Though "FLYPaper" has its limits, on balance it seems like a prom-
ising solution for what I've called the cold glow firm. First, about some
of those limits. As the duo acknowledges, entrepreneurs can effectively
sell the firm without actually signing on a dotted line. 93 For instance, a
founder could cause the firm to issue high-interest, subordinated debt,
and use the proceeds to issue herself dividends. The new lender is basi-
cally an equity holder, and the founder has in essence cashed out her
interest in the firm. More prosaically, the entrepreneur could just begin
89 Strom, supra note 1 (describing the "quiet push to get preferential tax treatment for
[hybrids] ").
90 Or maybe it is a race to the top-these entities could deserve more subsidies than
society is currently giving them. But see Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 43, at 38-52. I am skep-
tical of this proposition, but will leave extended discussion on this topic for elsewhere.
91 Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 2, at 1498-99.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1522-23.
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to manage the firm in a way that maximizes the cash value of her resid-
ual claim, elevating profit over other goals.
Brakman Reiser and Dean have an answer to these issues, but their
answer only really works for the cold glow firm. They propose (in a
footnote) that the equity conversion privilege could be triggered by
events other than sale, such as if the manager extracts excessive divi-
dends.94 In other words, the parties negotiate contractual terms to pre-
vent the manager from reneging on their deal. As we've seen, though,
those contracts are typically prohibitively difficult to write when the
firm is producing some complex charitable good.95 They're reasonably
manageable, however, for simple, cold-glow-reducing tasks.
Even aside from the possibility that the manager will renege on the
nonprofit side of the deal, debt financing introduces additional agency
costs for the firm. Nonprofits, too, can borrow.96 Thus, if the entrepre-
neur has chosen a for-profit form, rather than a traditional nonprofit,
she is signaling to creditors her willingness to manage the firm in a way
that produces returns greater than a salary and pension could provide.
Traditionally, this requires risk, which again is contrary to the prefer-
ences of most creditors.97
In order to limit the resulting agency costs of borrowing, firms
usually prefer a mix of debt and equity financing.9 8 To get a sense of
whether those costs are important, note that many firms continue to
rely heavily on equity financing, despite a combined federal and state
tax subsidy for borrowing that can range upwards of 40%.99
Overall, though, the FLY paper proposal helps to fill the most im-
portant hole in social enterprise statutes. Convertible debt instruments
are likely to be fairly ineffective at governing the daily business of an
94 Id. at 1524 n.144.
95 As Brakman Reiser & Dean note, contractual terms or "covenants" are common in
the bond industry, id. at 1517 n.112, and this would be a standard way to prevent managers
from issuing large amounts of new debt. But I am not aware of any existing covenant guar-
anteeing that managers will act charitably in other respects.
96 For example, using data derived from the Form 990 tax returns filed annually by
501(c) (3) organizations, I calculated that the mean reported debt to asset ratio at report-
ing public charities during the 2009 fiscal year was about 44:1. Mean total debt was about
$59.5 million. I am grateful to the National Center on Charitable Statistics for providing
me access to the 990 information.
97 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 11, at 334-35.
"' For a basic overview of the considerations involved in the balance between debt and
equity, see CARNEY, supra note 25, at 217-29.
99 For a review of the importance of the tax distortion in debt-equity decisions, see
Ruud A. de Mooij, The Tax Elasticity of Corporate Debt: A Synthesis of Size aud Variations 22-23
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/95, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com /sol3 papers.cfm?abstract id=1826548.
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entity conducting both profitable and complex charitable actities.
Then again, combining those two forms will rarely be feasible tinder
any governance structure. FLY paper really takes off when issued by
firms wanting to commit to relatively simple, discrete tasks; in that set-
ting it both provides protection against opportunistic exit and also may
help with daily governance.
CONCLUSION
Brakman Reiser and Dean propose a welcome addition to the ex-
isting corporate governance toolkit. Although the specific instrument
they describe has some limitations, their idea also opens a promising
aveie for flrther innovation. 100 As I mentioned earlier, the absence of
effective pay instruients for aligning managerial and stakeholder in-
terests adds greatly to the costs of contracting for the production of
charitable goods. If fiture generations of FLY Paper-like instruments-
FLY spawn?-could fill that gap, they would revolutionize the charitable
firm. 101
In the meantiie, their work adds an appropriate note of caution
to recent social enterprise exuberance. I have tried to deepen that note
here. So far, social enterprise looks more like a state scheme for extract-
ing federal subsidies than a solution for any corporate governance
problem.
100 For example, states could experiment with alternative formulations of default rules
for hybrid instruments. Investors could diversify the risk of each alternative scheme by
putting money in firms in each of the rival jurisdictions. Cf Kelli A. Alces, LegalDivcrsifica-
tion, 113 CoLUM. L. Rrv. 1977 (suggesting that legal rules may supply a source of diversifi-
cation).
101 For another set of possibilities, see Julia Y. Lee, Gaining Assurances, 2012 Wis. L.
Rrv. 1137, 1145-59 (describing the use of conditional guarantees to overcome problems of
collective contribution to shared goods).
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